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Finance & Economics
財經版塊
The Indo-Pacific economy
印太地區的經濟
A new pact for Asia: just don’t call it a trade deal
為亞洲定制的新條約：不要把它當做貿易協議
Amere three days after being sworn in as president in January 2017, Donald Trump signed an executive order withdrawing America from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp), a 12-country free-trade deal he had railed against on the campaign trail.
在2017年1月宣誓就任美國總統三天后，唐納德·特朗普簽署了一項讓美國退出跨太平洋伙伴關系協定(tpp)的行政命令，這是他在競選期間抨擊的一項12國自由貿易協定。
On May 23rd, 488 days after his own swearing-in, President Joe Biden tried to reverse some of the damage by unveiling a new pact, the 13-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (ipef).
5月23日，在宣誓就職488天后，喬·拜登總統試圖通過公布一項新協定——13國印太經濟框架(ipef)來彌補一些損害。
That Mr Biden took so much longer to launch his Asian trade policy illustrates one basic truth: it is far easier to tear up agreements than it is to craft them anew.
拜登花了這么長的時間來啟動他的亞洲貿易政策，這說明了一個基本的事實：撕毀協議遠比重新制定協議容易。
Inevitably, one way to look at the ipef is by way of comparison to the tpp (which lives on in reduced form, absent America).
不可避免，人們對ipef的一種解讀是把它與tpp (以簡化形式存在，不包括美國)進行比較。
Some bits sound rather familiar. One selling-point for the tpp was that it was a “21st-century trade agreement” complete with high standards for workers’ rights and e-commerce rules.
有些說法聽起來很耳熟。tpp的一個亮點是，它是一項“21世紀的貿易協定”，對工人權利和電子商務規則有著高標準要求。
The ipef is also “a 21st-century economic arrangement”, according to Jake Sullivan, America’s national security adviser.
美國國家安全顧問杰克·沙利文表示，ipef也是“21世紀的經濟規劃”。
The original tpp members accounted for nearly 40% of global gdp, roughly the same share as the current ipef partners.
最初的tpp成員國占全球gdp的近40%，與目前的ipef成員國的份額大致相同。
Most crucially, China is still excluded.
最關鍵的是，中國仍然被排除在外。
The ipef, like the tpp, is an attempt to build a trading structure in Asia that enshrines both America’s economic principles and its economic power.
與tpp一樣，ipef試圖在亞洲建立一個既包含美國經濟原則，又包含美國經濟實力的貿易結構。
That, however, is where the similarities end.
然而，兩者的相似之處也僅限于此。
Mr Trump’s success in winning support with his calls to stop countries “ripping off” America has made many in Washington leery of ambitious free-trade deals.
特朗普呼吁阻止美國被“剝削”，成功贏得了支持，這讓華盛頓的許多人對雄心勃勃的自由貿易協定持懷疑態度。
So rather than starting work on a pact that would require approval from Congress, Mr Biden’s team has designed a framework that is more malleable and may avoid that political death-trap.
因此，拜登的團隊并沒有開始制定一項需要國會批準的協議，而是設計了一個更具可塑性的框架，這也許能避免陷入政治死亡的困境。
In announcing the launch, Katherine Tai, the United States Trade Representative (ustr), pledged to “keep Congress close” in shaping the ipef--a far cry from putting it to a vote.
在宣布啟動該計劃時，美國貿易代表邰麗華(Katherine Tai)承諾在制定ipef時會“與國會保持密切聯系”——這與最終送去表決相距甚遠。
Malleability has a few big downsides. It limits what America can offer.
這種可塑性也有幾個很大的缺點。它限制了美國能提供的東西。
A cut in tariff rates, a plank of most free-trade deals, is a non-starter because it would require congressional support.
降低關稅是大多數自由貿易協定的重要組成部分，但由于需要國會的支持，降低關稅是不可能的。
America still vows to push for strong labour and environmental standards but, unable to offer more access to its vast market, it lacks a key bargaining chip.
美國仍承諾推行強有力的勞工和環境標準，但由于無法讓其他國家進入其廣闊的市場，美國損失了一個關鍵的談判籌碼。
The durability of the ipef is also in doubt.
ipef的持久性也存在疑問。
Were Mr Trump to return to the Oval Office in 2024, he would not need three days to ditch the framework.
如果特朗普在2024年重返白宮的橢圓形辦公室(Oval Office)，不到3天他就會放棄該框架。
The Biden administration has tried to make a virtue of these limits.
拜登政府想要利用這些限制。
Rather than conceiving of the ipef as a conventional deal, it has declared that the pact will rest on four pillars, with trade promotion just one.
它沒有把ipef設想成一項常規協議，而是宣稱該協議有四個基本支柱，而貿易促進只是其中一個。
The other three goals are to make supply chains more resilient; to promote infrastructure investment and clean energy; and to form new rules on taxation and anti-corruption.
另外三個目標是讓供應鏈更具彈性; 促進基礎設施投資和清潔能源; 并制定稅收和反腐敗的新規則。
It is tempting to dismiss such a wide-ranging agenda as too vague to amount to anything.
人們很容易認為，這樣一個涉獵廣泛的議程太過模糊，沒有任何意義。
But paradoxically, a near-stumble at the launch of the framework illustrated that it could, in theory, have force to its contents: America had to tone down the language in its founding documents, otherwise some in Asia would have balked at signing them.
但矛盾的是，框架啟動時的一次差錯表明，從理論上講，它的內容是有力量的:美國必須淡化其創始文件中的語言，否則一些亞洲國家會拒絕簽署這些文件。
Matthew Goodman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank, notes that the focus on topics such as digital trade, competition policy and bribery makes for a good menu for the ipef.
智庫戰略與國際研究中心的馬修·古德曼指出，對數字貿易、競爭政策和賄賂等話題的關注讓ipef的內容看起來還不錯。
“These are issues that are very much in the interest of our partners in the region,” he says. At the same time, breadth poses a challenge.
他表示:“這些問題非常符合我們在該地區的合作伙伴的利益?！?與此同時，框架的廣度也帶來了挑戰。
Instead of just having the ustr as the lead negotiator, as in normal trade talks, the Commerce Department is in charge of the non-trade portfolio.
與普通貿易談判中只有美國貿易代表作為首席談判代表不同，此次美國商務部負責的是非貿易部門。
That risks turning it into a multi-headed beast.
這就可能讓該框架變成多元領導機制。
For now, many in the region are most pleased by the symbolism. The wounds from America’s tpp exit are still raw.
目前，該地區的許多國家對這一規定的象征意義最為滿意。美國退出tpp的傷口仍未愈合。
Since Mr Biden’s election victory, allies have waited and waited for America to devise a new Asian trade strategy.
自拜登當選以來，盟友們一直在等待美國制定新的亞洲貿易戰略。
At last it has arrived, even if it is more notable for its political constraints than its economic potential.
雖然政治約束比經濟潛力更引人注目，但它最終還是到來了。
“We are just happy to have them at the table,” says one Australian official.
一位澳大利亞官員表示:“我們很高興他們加入進來?！?/p>
